Following the accident, OSHA dispatched a Compliance Safety and Health Officer to investigate. Based upon the inspection, review of relevant documents, and employee interviews, OSHA issued four serious citations alleging that JWP failed to properly determine the characteristics and conditions of the electrical line before beginning work, conduct the required job briefing, ensure that sources of electrical energy were opened and rendered inoperable through proper lockout/tagout procedures, and properly ground the line before performing the repair.

JWP contested the citations, and the parties presented their evidence before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). JWP had safety policies addressing the hazards involved, and its employees received training concerning deenergization, lockout/tagout, job briefings, and grounding. The ALJ did not find that the written rules themselves were inadequate. Rather, the problem was whether JWP actually ensured that those rules were followed in the field.

Significantly, the evidence showed no consistent program for monitoring field employees or supervisors. Approximately 120 employees worked in the field, and late-night emergency repairs occurred approximately once per week, often involving high-risk power-line work. Nevertheless, there was little evidence of programmed field inspections before the accident to determine whether employees were complying with JWP’s safety procedures.

The decision reiterates an often-repeated axiom in this Safety Series: an effective safety program cannot exist only on paper. Employers must periodically observe employees performing actual work, conduct field inspections, and document those efforts. This is particularly important for employees performing hazardous work at remote locations or outside normal working hours.

Here, the crew was required to conduct a job briefing and Job Safety Analysis (JSA) before beginning work. That process was especially important because it should have required the employees to identify the line, determine its characteristics, and evaluate how it could be safely deenergized before attempting the repair.

The required briefing, however, did not occur. Although a superintendent asked whether a JSA had been completed, he did not review it, participate in a complete briefing, or verify that the necessary safety issues had actually been addressed. The JSA later discovered was missing most of the vital information. The ALJ found that merely accepting another employee’s representation that the JSA had been completed was insufficient.

For employers, a JSA should be a substantive hazard assessment, not simply paperwork. Before power-line work begins, supervisors should verify the identity and ownership of the line, potential energy sources, deenergization procedures, lockout/tagout requirements, grounding procedures, necessary equipment, and employee responsibilities.

The accident also illustrates the danger of assumptions when working around electrical lines. The foreman tested the line and believed it was deenergized. The crew pulled fuses from a meter they mistakenly believed supplied the line but failed to identify the actual source of electrical energy. The foreman also used a screwdriver in a procedure referred to as “fuzzing” to determine whether the line was energized, a practice contrary to company policy. The crew ultimately failed to open and render inoperable the actual source supplying the line and failed to properly lock or tag the switches they believed controlled the power.

Employers should require employees to positively identify all energy sources and follow established deenergization and lockout/tagout procedures before beginning work. The absence of voltage at one moment should never be treated as proof that a line cannot become reenergized.

The crew also failed to properly ground the line and did not even have grounding chains in their service truck. This was particularly significant because the line was ultimately reenergized by someone miles away. Proper grounding procedures are intended to protect workers against precisely this type of unexpected energization. Employers should ensure that crews have the required grounding equipment before dispatch and require supervisors to verify that grounding is completed before employees contact lines treated as deenergized.

The ALJ also addressed the qualifications of the superintendent sent to the site. Although an experienced and credentialed electrician, he lacked experience in power-line construction and maintenance and had been placed in the field before completing JWP’s normal orientation. The ALJ found that JWP either failed to adequately train him before sending him into the field or failed to properly assess whether his existing knowledge and experience qualified him to supervise the work.

Construction employers should not assume that general experience or professional credentials automatically qualify a supervisor for every specialized operation. Supervisory training must correspond to the hazards and work being overseen.

Ultimately, the ALJ affirmed all four serious violations and assessed monetary penalties against JWP. The broader lesson extends beyond power-line contractors. Safety policies and training are only the foundation. Construction employers must combine training with competent supervision, meaningful job briefings, field inspections, documented enforcement, and verification that critical procedures are actually followed. When employees work around power lines, employers must ensure that safety procedures are not merely taught but understood, supervised, verified, and enforced in the field.

About the author: Costas Cyprus, Esq., is a partner at the firm of Welby, Brady & Greenblatt, LLP, in White Plains, N.Y. He practices construction law and commercial litigation and can be reached at 914-428-2100 or at ccyprus@wbgllp.com. The articles in this series do not constitute legal advice and are intended for general guidance only.

Published: October 15, 2026.